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Political context
For the past three years, Belgium has been drawn 
into the spotlight of European debate on terrorism 
and radicalisation. The terrorist attacks in Paris in 
2015 and Brussels in 2016 perpetrated by the same 
home-grown terrorist cell in Brussels, the dismantling 
of another terrorist cell in Verviers, the exceptionally 
high number of citizens joining Daesh in Syria and Iraq, 
and a series of terrorism-related incidents has led to 
an intense public scrutiny of Belgium’s seemingly 
inadequate counter-terrorism and related counter-
radicalisation measures.  
Following the terrorist attacks of 2015 – 2016, the 
Belgian government introduced some policy changes 
reflecting the major EU strategies on security and 
terrorism labelled by scholars as mostly reactive 
and “event-driven” in nature (Coolsaet 2010, 858). 
Overall, the EU’s contribution is not meant to replace 
the work of the Member States (ibid.) and therefore, 
even though the Belgian system is developing in line 
with the common EU security agenda, the national 
policy-making is, to a great extent, shaped by practise, 
experience and context that are designed to provide 
a unique response to Belgium’s particular challenges. 
The focus on national (or even local) trends and 
necessities is not surprising, given that there is 
yet very little consensus among practitioners and 
scholars themselves regarding theoretical models 
on the radicalisation process (Sageman 2004; Huq 
2010; Patel 2011; Neumann 2008; Roy 2008 ). Yet, 
there is also a severe lack of empirically sound 
evaluations of counter-radicalisation policies and 
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practices (Christmann, 2012; Feddes & Gallucci 2015, 
Schmid 2013) because of the multitude of drivers 
for radicalisation and extended number of contexts 
they touch upon. Even more, there is a general 
frustration both among scholars and practitioners 
who are not only dealing with complexities of inter-
related concepts, such as: radicalisation, radicalism, 
The prevention of violent radicalisation as part 
of counter-terrorism measures is a top priority 
of the European Union and national security 
agendas. In 2015 Belgium introduced promising 
reforms in countering radicalisation and terrorism 
that aimed at connecting not only intelligence, 
security and police services across different 
policy levels but also the multitude of other 
stakeholders representing the government and 
civil society. However, the implementation and 
further development of the Belgian approach 
to prevention of radicalisation remain contested 
in political and public debate. This stands to 
reason because there is a lack of empirical 
data and a certain disregard of the voices of 
first-line practitioners who develop and operate 
preventive measures on the ground. Taking 
this into account, this IES policy brief provides 
a critical overview of the current state of 
Belgium’s counter-radicalisation policy through 
the prism of analysis of stakeholders’ vision of 
the present challenges:  the conceptualisation 
of radicalisation in theory and practise, inter-
agency and multi-stakeholder collaboration, and 
the evidence-based evaluation of interventions.
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de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation, or counter- 
violent extremism (Schmid 2013) but also with the 
interlinkages of these concepts with terrorism or 
counter-terrorism. This is, among others, due to 
the very demand-driven nature of counter-terrorism 
and radicalisation research, meaning that many 
research projects are designed as service providers 
for security agencies in order to find patterns for 
surveillance measures (Kundnani 2012). In addition, 
it is obvious that gathering empirical data on 
radicalised or radicalising individuals is limited by 
data protection principles, restrictions imposed by 
police and intelligence services, and a habitual lack 
of cooperation of the individuals concerned.  
This IES policy brief is aimed at sketching a critical 
overview of the current Belgian counter-violent 
extremism policy (CVE), including radicalisation, 
and which involves different state levels and 
various processes, structures and actors. More 
specifically, considering the inconclusive academic 
debates and cross-cutting context-driven practical 
approaches, it will focus on addressing policy 
gaps and stakeholders’ needs as identified by 
practitioners involved both in the conceptualisation 
and realisation of CVE initiatives. This overview is 
based largely on the results of the two-day meeting 
with CVE stakeholders organised in cooperation 
with the European Foundation for Democracy in 
the framework of the H2020 Mindb4Act project’s 
study visit on 21-22 June 2018 in Brussels. The 
project overall targets at building a community of 
practice for providing innovative, ethical and effective 
solutions for tackling violent extremism in the EU 
Member States. During the meetings, representatives 
from governmental agencies, academia, grass-
roots organisations, schools, and international 
organisations exchanged views on practical 
implementation of CVE methods and tools in Belgium 
and in the EU, and the most evident gaps impeding 
the work of the multiple actors involved. The analysis 
of the insights gathered will contribute to a better 
understanding of the Belgian national approach 
and the formulation of key points in addressing the 
gaps in CVE, informing policy-makers and first-line 
practitioners alike1.
Belgian CVE structure
The CVE policies in the federal state of Belgium 
are organised in a relatively horizontal and non-
hierarchical structure in accordance with the 
respective competences of different bodies at various 
policy levels. Belgian state structure comprises a 
wide array of actors including: the local and federal 
police, the two intelligence services, representatives 
of relevant ministries (Interior, Justice, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance), representatives of the communities 
and regions, local administrations, public research 
institutes, social services and education system(s). 
Non-state actors such as grass-roots organisations 
or community projects are also involved but mostly 
on the local municipal level. 
As stipulated in constitutional arrangements, the 
federal level is essentially in charge of hard-core 
security policies with its coercive measures, whereas 
regions are almost exclusively in charge of prevention. 
The Belgian CVE design is thus not based on a top-
down chain of command, but on the principle of 
subsidiarity, depending on the task and the most 
relevant level of agency that is taking on this task.
At the federal level, within the National Security 
Council and two Security and Intelligence 
Committees (Coordination and Strategic) there 
are various ministries, LEAs and intelligence 
services involved in policy design and supervision. 
However, the main implementing agency at the 
federal level is the Coordination Unit for Threat 
Analysis (CUTA). CUTA was established in 2006, 
replacing its predecessor the Mixed Anti-Terrorism 
Group (Anti-terroristische Gemengde Groep, AGG), 
a coordination and cooperation platform for all 
security and intelligence services with a notoriously 
poor record of performance (Lasoen 2017). CUTA 
primarily aimed at: (1) centralising and coordinating 
information flows between different security and 
law enforcement agencies, (2) assessing the threat 
environment, (3) supervising the implementation of 
Plan-R (2005) – an action plan against radicalism. 
In 2015, it was tasked with revising the Plan-R. 
Compared to the original design of the Plan (limited 
3                 Policy   brief • n° 2018/02
to the identification of hotspots of radicalisation, 
assigning responsibility to specific agencies 
to control specific hotspots, and organising the 
information flow along a National Task Force 
and a number of Local Task Forces), the revised 
2015 plan-R also addressed prevention issues. 
The very latest version of the plan describes the 
drivers of radicalisation and the mechanisms of 
interaction between various stakeholders, such 
as law enforcement and preventive services at 
various state levels. 
The plan provides some key working definitions. 
Radicalisation is explained as “striving to and/or 
supporting drastic changes in society, which may 
pose a threat to the democratic system of law (the 
goal), potentially by using undemocratic methods 
(the means), which may harm the functioning of 
the democratic system of laws (the effect)”. More 
generally, “radicalism is the willingness to accept 
the ultimate consequences of a certain way of 
thinking and putting it into practice.” Primarily the 
plan focuses on mapping various actors involved in 
CVE and describes the modes of collaboration and 
coordination among them. More precisely, aiming to 
improve the interaction among various Belgian actors, 
such as law enforcement and intelligence services, 
social and youth workers, municipal administrations, 
sports clubs and religious communities, the plan 
describes a mechanism consisting of three pillars: 
1) national task force; 2) local task force and 3) local 
integrated security cells – all built up on efficient 
data sharing between law enforcement, practitioners 
and the public sector. 
The National Task Force (NTF) is the central strategic 
policy body and is composed of intelligence services, 
law enforcement agents and representatives of 
relevant ministries such as justice and interior. 
The NTF maintains thematic working groups on 
radicalisation whose objective is to develop the 
relevant, in-depth knowledge of the various drivers of 
radicalisation and to advise on measures to address 
them. Currently there are four permanent working 
groups (prisons, Radio/Television, Prevention and 
Communication), five thematic working groups 
(Salafism, Extreme Right, Extreme Left, Asia Minor 
and North Caucasus) and four ad hoc working groups 
(Hate Preachers, Mosques and Asylum/Migration, 
Foreign Fighters).
The Local Task Forces (LTFs) were established by the 
initial 2005 Plan R (Renard and Coolsaet 2018). They 
link the provincial and/or municipal and federal levels 
as ‘operational consulting bodies’ for intelligence 
and security services within specific geographic 
areas. The LTF’s purpose is to serve as a platform 
for the exchange of information, intelligence and 
analyses, to develop and coordinate information 
gathering activities, to propose new entries into the 
Joint Information Box on radicalised individuals and 
groups, to support front line police officers with the 
necessary knowledge, to liaise with local authorities 
and to propose, where applicable, preventive 
and disruptive measures (ibid.). Thus, “[g]iven its 
composition, the nature of the discussions within 
the LTF is security-oriented” (ibid., 36) with rather 
traditional security language involved.
On the municipal level, so-called ‘Local Integrated 
Security Cells’ (LISCs) were established in 2015. The 
exact composition of LISCs lies in the discretion 
of the municipal authorities themselves and may 
include all actors with a potential role in countering 
radicalisation such as the municipal police, local 
politicians, business associations, youth movements, 
local NGOs, or neighbourhood associations. The LISCs 
are established to ensure the information exchange 
between the social and preventive services, the LTF 
and the administrative authorities (mainly the mayor). 
During the workshop, it became apparent that CVE 
stakeholders, a number of which are playing a 
role in Plan R themselves, have various criticisms 
of the implementation of this mechanism. The 
participants stressed that although collaborative 
structures nominally exist, they feel that there 
is a lack of communication between different 
policy levels and their respective authorities. As 
a consequence, at higher policy levels there is 
limited knowledge of thriving communities and their 
accompanying ideologies. The participants also 
mentioned that the effectiveness of collaboration 
and coordination between different policy levels or 
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different regions/municipalities too often depends 
on the inter-personal relationships of officials 
instead of formalised and institutionalised exchange. 
Furthermore, even if such exchange exists, it focuses 
on sharing of (subjectively) good practices, which 
hampers a solid, evidence-based evaluation of 
policies. In that regard, practitioners also mentioned 
that mutual need for financial resources fosters a 
reciprocal good-natured assessment of policies that 
emphasises intention over actual impact. However, 
it is not only implementation that is a source of 
concern among practitioners. Several first-line 
practitioners assessed policy design in Belgium 
as slow, event-driven and not adequately reflecting 
the dynamic development of specific trends within 
communities and neighbourhoods. For example, 
when Daesh peaked in territory, power and influence 
that saw young Europeans leaving for Syria to fight 
in the civil war, the issue of foreign terrorist fighters 
was guiding the creation of policies. Thus, presently 
(as the practitioners noted) since almost no one is 
now leaving for the Levant anymore, the policies 
being implemented do not fully address current 
challenges such as: the integration of returnees (in 
particular children), the prosecution of women, or 
radicalisation in prisons. 
The role of regional bodies: Brussels 
Prevention and Security
Between the federal and municipal levels, there lies 
a regional level, where a lot of work on developing 
specific counter-radicalisation, prevention and 
intervention programmes is done. Brussels 
Capital region activity is predominantly operated 
by the Brussels Prevention and Security (BPS), 
coordinating the security and prevention policy 
at the regional level together with the police, 
municipalities and civil society. The Association 
of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG) is 
the Flemish counterpart for BPS, it includes 
Flemish municipalities and their police zones, 
public service initiatives (“intercommunales”) and 
the Alarm Group Belgium. During the June 2018 
study visit, the Mindb4Act delegation visited the 
BPS to receive the most recent information on the 
spectrum of activities organised in the region.
The BPS’ role in the framework of ‘Plan R’, as 
an integral part of the National Taskforce, is to 
coordinate LISCs in the Brussels-Capital region. In 
this respect the BPS is an essential actor, managing 
the chains of local municipal stakeholders and 
organising an extended variety of activities 
supporting local actors.
What first came into the spotlight was that, in 
practice, the BPS avoids dealing with the vague 
concept of radicalisation, preferring (by and 
large) to put the concept of ‘polarisation’ at the 
core of their business. The Global Security and 
Prevention Plan2 (2017-2020) produced by the 
BPS, defined polarisation as “the strengthening of 
opposition between [persons or] groups in society 
that results or can result in (the exacerbation of) 
tensions between these [persons or] groups and 
create risks for the security of society” (p. 17). 
The choice of terminology by the BPS relies on 
the theory of a Dutch philosopher, Bart Brandsma, 
who identifies polarisation as a thought construct, 
often irrational, that states that humans, in order to 
think, need categorisations and polarities to which 
they attach a specific value (Brandsma 2017). In 
essence, humans tend to define the world into 
“us” and “the other”. Brandsma bases polarisation 
theory on ‘fundamental insights’ into the dynamic of 
polarization, different roles taken up by actors within 
a polarization dynamic and defined game-changers 
that allow the breakup of that dynamic. The model 
is highly popular all over Europe and there are 
specialised training sessions organised not only for 
Belgian LEAs but also for European ones too. The 
BPS themselves are training first-line practitioners in 
polarisation in order to formulate possible impacts 
of practitioners’ actions. The training underlines 
the importance of early prevention (working on ‘the 
silent’, as they put it), explains the interconnectivity 
between radicalisation and polarisation and opens 
up the concept of violent radicalisation to other 
tensions that may challenge security and order, 
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such as vandalism using  Gulenist symbols after the 
attempted coup in Turkey during the summer 2017, or 
demonstrations/counterdemonstrations of far right/
left-wing extremists in the region.
Unlike CUTA, the BPS largely focuses on soft preventive 
measures, thus deconstructing  the traditional 
conceptualisation of security and power defined at 
the federal level, which by and large corresponds to 
the level of the BPS’ activity. It is worth highlighting 
that these two entities are not competitors, but 
complementary organisations with different tasks, in 
line with the division of their competences. 
For instance, the BPS is working on the dynamics 
of group relations in Brussels, such as demographic 
and economic inequality and other sources of tension 
between communities that may lead to polarisation. 
Overall, the BPS supports various types of local actors 
by sharing expertise and providing: 1) Analysis; 2) 
Support in establishing risk criteria; 3) Collection and 
analysis of statistical data, and 4) Financial support 
for projects carried out by police zones, municipalities 
and NGOs. In terms of financial support for grass-
roots projects, the BPS launches calls for proposals, 
announced in the official journal and published for 
use by local partners. The evaluation of such project 
proposals is not easy, as one needs to evaluate true 
risk versus work effort spent on the realisation of 
such projects (Mueller and Stewart 2014). The BPS 
also runs its own projects on transversal topics 
attempting to safeguard social cohesion and 
security issues. For example, it took a major role 
in the development of the Brussels Prevention and 
Proximity Plan which includes surveillance of public 
spaces, youth work and neighbourhood outreach. 
The polarisation and security team within the BPS 
hosts a monthly platform in which all the prevention 
services from the 19 Brussels municipalities are 
present and have the chance to exchange ideas with 
experts from research think-tanks, penitentiary staff, 
youth workers and policy-makers. 
In general, evaluation and assessment are the 
bottlenecks in any policy and especially in CVE, 
since the policy in this field reflects a dynamic 
reality implying a rapid search for deradicalising 
methods and tools. Based on the grid-system of 
indicators, developed in close cooperation with the 
municipalities, the evaluation of plans and policies 
takes place in thematic workshops in which internal 
evaluators from the municipalities assess the policies 
of the respective last two years. However, there are 
many questions that still remain unanswered. In 
this respect, considering the national context, which 
comprise a multitude of structures, actors, processes 
and dynamics, is a true challenge. According to BPS 
practitioners, taken overall, the development of 
indicators needed for the polarisation assessment 
scale is already underway.
Regional bodies, such as the BPS, are crucial in linking 
state structures and civil society involvement at both 
the federal and local levels. Federal authorities have, 
in accordance with their competences, a clear focus 
on security-related issues, while on the local and 
municipal levels, in particular when NGOs and grass-
roots organisations are involved, the focus is on socio-
preventive measures. This state of affairs leads to a 
certain degree of uncertainty among local authorities 
regarding what is actually expected of them by 
the higher policy levels, and it also causes distrust 
between the various actors as it often remains unclear 
which objectives and strategies other agencies and 
authorities are pursuing. In addition, the respective 
expertise regarding different aspects of CVE and 
counter-radicalisation initiatives on the federal level 
(security measures) and local level (socio-preventive 
measures) are not harmonised, which further 
complicates cooperation. This gap is most likely best 
addressed at the regional level as the natural contact 
point between state structures and community level 
involvement, particularly if it concerns a complex 
metropolitan area such as Brussels. 
Conclusions 
Following the overview of Belgium’s counter-
radicalisation policies and the insights gained during 
the meetings in the framework of Mindb4Act, several 
observations can be articulated as the main conclusions.
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To begin with, Belgium’s federal structure, that 
comprises a variety of different levels of governance 
along linguistic communities, regions, municipalities 
and cities is already complex, and that impacts on the 
implementation of initiatives scattered throughout 
all the levels. In this regard, one of the challenges 
of implementing Plan R, i.e. effective coordination 
between all the state levels, is the overall adherence 
to hard-core security. It is a fact that the plan itself 
was initially highly promoted by the federal security 
authorities. Thus, it not only focuses on the input 
from LEAs but also defines their leading role in 
the hierarchy of counter-radicalisation actors by 
assigning permanent membership of LEAs in 
the National Task Force. This, to a certain extent, 
conflicts with the approach favoured at regional level, 
that rather focuses on softer preventive measures, 
while constructing and deconstructing the traditional 
understanding of security when interpreting mass 
demonstrations, discrimination or inequality. 
The concepts of polarisation and prevention at 
the regional level highlight inconsistencies in 
terminology at regional and federal levels- this could 
be considered both a weakness and a strength of the 
Belgian approach to CVE. Since concepts determine 
approaches, on the one hand, Belgian authorities 
might be confused if they actually address the same 
or different phenomena, which embrace different 
concepts. On the other hand, use of diversified 
terminologies might contribute to the expansion of 
the toolbox available in countering violent extremism 
by addressing psycho-sociological phenomena, like 
demography, discrimination, ethnical tensions and 
conflicts, feeling of belonging, integration etc.
Another point is that in Belgium, there is a network 
of around 30 municipalities which is accustomed to 
exchanging good practice and common guidelines for 
local authorities. As the contexts vary, local authorities 
have a hard time bringing a set of measures close 
to their own context. Thus, better exchange of 
information in diversified forms through mutual face-
to-face or online training, reporting, evaluation and 
assessment, between all the state levels is needed. 
The results of such exchange would certainly depend 
on the quality of activities organised. 
So far, a big emphasis in CVE multi-stakeholder 
collaboration in Belgium and beyond is put on 
exchanging good practises, where open discussion of 
probable failures and lessons learnt is often avoided 
in order not to undermine or question financial 
expenditure. However, such a fearless frank exchange 
of views and objective reflection on the work done is 
precisely what is needed to boost the performance of 
the various CVE actors, who, amongst other things, 
would learn from less successful operations.
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Endnotes
1 This Policy Brief does not in any way represent the official 
views of the participants of the meetings. It is based on 
analytical interpretation of the information received from the 
first-line practitioners through the meetings.
2 http://www.veiligheid-securite.brussels/sites/default/files/
Plan%20GVPP%20Nederlands.pdf
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